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Abstract 
The fraction of marriages between South Korean males and brides from 
other Asian countries has sharply increased since 1990 reaching around 
10% of new marriages in 2005. We employ a large data set collected in 
2012 to investigate the impact of citizenship acquisition of these brides 
on their bargaining power in the household and labor market. We employ 
propensity score matching using detailed information of brides, their 
spouses, and households required for nationality application. Our results 
show that legal entitlement of marriage immigrants raises the chance of 
being hired as a regular worker and increases decision power in a 
household. The findings in this paper imply that a legal framework is an 
important determinant of the bargaining power of immigrants in the labor 
market and households.  
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1 Introduction 
International marriage between a man from a developed country and a woman from 
a developing country is sharply increasing in Asia. In South Korea, around 10% of new 
marriages were union between South Korean male and brides from other Asian countries in 
2005. According to Edlund et al (2013), one in four marriages in Taiwan was international 
marriage between foreign-born brides from developing countries in 2003.  
In spite of rapid increase in foreign born brides, relatively little research has been 
done on this new trend of immigration or policy instrument targeted on them. In this paper, 
we aim to analyze the impact of legal entitlement on bargaining power of marriage 
immigrants in South Korea. We focus on bargaining power of foreign born brides because 
we expect that their bargaining power is a key factor affecting assimilation of those brides 
and their second generation.  
The bargaining power within couples is not simply determined by the characteristics 
of two people in a family, but also by the surrounding social environment such as cultural 
norms and legal systems. In particular, laws related to the dissolution of marriage affect the 
outside option of marriage, thereby influencing the bargaining position within couples. In 
this paper, we investigate the relationship between legal entitlement and bargaining power 
of marriage immigrants in Korea using detailed information required for the nationality 
application. 
 Recently, few researches examined this new type of immigrants in Asian countries. 
Kawaguchi and Lee (2012) suggested that the lack of women’s job opportunity in rural area 
of developed countries bring about the demand for foreign brides from developing 
countries. Wang and Chang (2002) examined the cross-border marriage market and found 
out growing commodification of female migrant partners as market grows matured. Edlund 
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et al (2013) examined the effect of foreign brides on native women and found out that 
inflow of marriage immigrants increase fertility among domestic brides.  
In this paper, we define marriage immigrants as foreign born brides from 
developing countries who marry to males in developed countries for economic benefit and 
opportunities. To identify those marriage immigrants, we restricted our sample to foreign 
brides who have very short pre-marriage periods with their spouses. Foreign born brides in 
our sample are from developing countries and whose year of first meeting, year of marriage, 
and year of entry to Korea are all the same. Couples are introduced to each other through a 
third party in more than 70% of cases.3 All these characteristics imply a short pre-marriage 
period of negotiation between couples and hence, likelihood that only the default legal 
framework and relevant policy will affect the marriage.  
The vulnerable legal status and potential threat these immigrant women would face 
is well studied in legal literature. Jang (1994) studied immigrants and refugee women and 
reported that these women are often the victims of domestic violence. Batterers often use 
the legal system to abuse their partners further by claiming annulment of marriage based on 
alleged fraudulent marriage. Loke (1997) also documented that battered immigrant women 
face fears of deportation and language and cultural barriers. The Immigration Act of 1990 
in the United States tried to protect victims of domestic violence; however, there still 
remain many problems regarding work authorization and public benefits.  
The legal status of immigrants are also generally related to their labor market 
performance as well. Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) examined 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act and found out that legalization of unauthorized immigrants is 
related to wage benefit. Ribera-Batiz (1999) also analyzed Mexican legal and illegal 
                                                          
3 Around 22% couples out of all international couples are reported to meet through brokers, while 17% 
and 27% are reported to meet through relatives and friends, respectively. 
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immigrants in the United States and found out that observed characteristics can explain 
only half of earnings differential unexplained part of earnings gain of legal immigrant 
should be attributed to legal status. Bratsberg et al (2002) also examined young male 
immigrants in U.S. and found out that citizenship is related to acceleration of wage growth.  
In this paper, we propose that nationality acquisition of marriage immigrants can 
strengthen their bargaining power in households and in the labor market. The Korean 
government enacted the two-year conditional residence and spousal support condition for 
increasing marriage immigrants to acquire naturalization. Without spousal support, they 
cannot acquire stable legal status in Korea and may face deportation upon divorce. This 
legal change redistributed the bargaining power from female marriage immigrants to their 
male counterparts by raising their dependence on their husbands. We examine whether this 
legal change affected the bargaining power of female marriage immigrants in the household 
and the labor market. 
Our hypothesis is based on exit-threat bargaining model (Lundberg and Pollak 1993, 
Manser and Brown 1980) that household distribution can be a function of each spouse's 
options outside of the marriage on bargaining power. The conditional residence to get 
Korean nationality raised the cost of divorce for marriage immigrants. The divorced women 
would lose their legal status in Korea and thus might lose their children as well. Though 
another revision in 2004 allowed those brides to acquire stable legal status through appeal, 
for foreign brides who have little knowledge of the legal system in Korea, it would be 
difficult to protect legal status through a complicated process.  
To examine our hypothesis, we employed a propensity score matching strategy to 
carefully measure the impact of legal entitlement on various outcomes reflecting bargaining 
power of these marriage immigrants. Using detailed data and the institutional requirements 
of Korean Immigration Authority we identify how foreign brides achieve Korean 
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nationality. Then we use that information to find a proper control group of foreign brides 
who have citizenship.  
Our results show that having nationality increases the chance of being hired as a 
regular worker in the labor market. It also increases the bargaining power of foreign brides 
by increasing their involvement into asset-related decision making or expenditure decisions 
to invite their family members from their origin countries. Our results are consistent when 
we included a network variable indicating that legal entitlement has an independent impact 
regardless of having a connection with immigrants from the same country. 
This paper is the first in the literature which examines the relationship between legal 
entitlement and bargaining power of marriage immigrants in a household and a labor 
market. We document legal status of marriage immigrants and its relationship with 
bargaining distribution in a household and labor market performance. Our paper fills in the 
gap in the literature by providing empirical evidence that legal framework not only affects 
labor market performance of immigrants but also household bargaining distribution in the 
case of marriage immigrants.  
This paper also provides important policy implication for increasing cross-border 
marriage in Asia. The bargaining power of marriage immigrant and their labor market 
performance is the key factor affecting their second generation and their assimilation into 
society. The policy aimed for assimilation of marriage immigrants and their second 
generation should consider potential effect that weak legal status on their bargaining power 
and household decision.  
In what follows, we first review historical backgrounds of marriage immigrants and 
changes in Korean nationality law in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we describe our data and 
show trends of citizenship acquisition among those marriage immigrants. We also show 
simple regression results and discuss choice of outcome variables which reflect bargaining 
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power of marriage immigrants in various ways. In Chapter 4, we show our empirical results 
using propensity score matching. We conclude in Chapter 5. 
 
2 Legal Institution Regarding Marriage Immigrants  
2.1 History of Foreign-born Brides in Korea 
<Figure 1 to be Inserted Here> 
Since the 1990s, marriage immigrants from other Asian countries account for a 
significant portion of immigration. <Figure 1> shows that the share of foreign brides 
sharply increased from 1% in 1993 to 8% in 2009 relative to that of foreign grooms. 
<Figure 2> also shows that there has been sharp change in the composition of foreign-born 
brides as well. In early 1990s, significant portion of foreign-brides are Japanese and 
Chinese. In 1992, South Korea established international relations and thereby Chinese 
immigrants started to move into South Korea in order to find better economic opportunities. 
Most of union between Korean and Japanese are known to be through Unification Church4. 
(Lee 2005)  
<Figure 2 to be Inserted Here> 
In late 1990s, the share of foreign-born brides from Vietnam and Philippines started 
to increase as well. The three factors should be considered to understand the rapid increase 
in foreign-born brides from developing countries: sending country, receiving country, and 
brokerage agencies between them.  
                                                          
4 Unification Church is founded in South Korea in 1954 by Sun Myung Moon and has expanded 
throughout the world with most members living in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.  
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The trend of increasing marriage immigrants can be observed in other Asian 
countries such as Taiwan and Japan. Kawaguchi and Lee (2012) suggest that the rapid 
improvement of women’s labor market opportunities is the main driving force behind the 
demand for marriage immigrants from developing countries to developed countries. As 
women's labor market option of receiving country increases, the relative gain from 
marriage deteriorated. Therefore, women with considerable labor market options may 
remain single, resulting in much imbalance in the sex ratio in the marriage market.  
Kim (2012) claims that gendered structure of society by class and region (urban-
rural) is the source of demand for foreign-born brides. Many educated women in urban area 
postpone their marriage for their career and thereby remain unmarried. On the other hand, 
many rural men such as farmers and fishermen have a hard time finding marriage partners 
since they are relatively less educated and thereby considered being unattractive in the 
marriage market. Imbalance in sex ratio caused by son preference (Kim 2009) is also 
suggested as a main factor affecting demand for foreign-born brides.  The sex ratio in 1989 
was 116.5 and slightly decreased to 110.2 in 2000. (National Statistical Office 2007)  
On the other hand, women in developing countries with poor economic conditions 
seek better socioeconomic status through marriage migration. Kim (2012) examined 
Vietnamese brides who received visas from Korean embassy and found out that 82 percent 
of brides are from rural areas in South Vietnam especially the Mekong River Delta region 
which contains some of the poorest communities in Vietnam.  For these women, 
international marriage to the USA, Japan, Korea or Taiwan is often considered to be 
moving up to a higher social rank.  Also, for these unskilled and relatively uneducated 
women in developing countries, marrying abroad is a relatively easy option for those 
women compared with finding a job opportunity in Korea as migrant workers. (Seol 2006) 
Brokerage agencies for international marriage started to increase in 2000 as 
regulation on these companies changed from license system to self-reporting system in 
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1999. (Lee 2005) According to Lee’s survey in 2005, there were 180 brokerage agencies 
for international marriage on the Internet in 2004. Seol (2006) conducted survey of female 
marriage migrants in 2005. Their survey shows that 27.7% of those marriage immigrants 
met their husbands through brokerage agencies. However, more than one fifth of total 
marriage immigrants and 44% of marriage immigrants who used brokerage agencies 
reported that they received the untrue information regarding their husbands before their 
marriage.  
There are two issues to be address in marriage migration in Korea: prevention of 
sham marriage and protection of marriage immigrants. It is reported that many of these 
female migrants experience much difficulty in Korea. According to Seol (2006)’s survey, 
31% of female marriage migrants reported being verbally abused by their husband and 14% 
reported physical abuse and only 10% of those women experienced abuses have reported to 
the police. Lee (2005) claims that economic disparities between two countries aggravate the 
unequal relationship between female marriage migrants and their spouses.  
At the same time, increase in shame marriage also remains as a major policy issue. 
The frequency of sham marriage is difficult to identify, but some small scale research or 
media reports raised worrisome voices about this issue.5 To prevent this kind of marriage 
fraud, Korean government changed requirements and qualification of marriage immigrants 
who apply for Korean nationality.  
 
2.2 Korean Nationality Act Regarding Foreign Spouse 
                                                          
5 Lee (2005) conducted small scale survey on female migrant workers at 20 restaurants and 
more than 50% of marriage migrants working in the restaurant reported that their marriage 
with Korean is indeed sham marriage to acquire nationality. 
10  
When the Korean Nationality Act was enacted in 1948, there were two kinds of 
naturalization; one for people married to Koreans and one for all the other people who wish 
to acquire Korean nationality. Affected by the paternalistic society at that time, there were 
two different rules for foreign brides and foreign grooms. Foreign brides could 
automatically acquire Korean nationality along with marriage while foreign grooms had to 
stay in Korea for at least three years and pass a nationality eligibility exam to get Korean 
nationality. The nationality of children was also decided by the nationality of their father.  
<Table 1 to be Inserted Here> 
<Table 1> shows different kinds of visa status and legal eligibility in Korea. Since 
Korea does not allow dual nationality of its people6 , marriage immigrants have to choose 
the nationality of their origin country or Korean nationality in order to stay for a long time 
without extending their status every three years. Permanent residency was only adopted in 
2002 and mainly aimed for Chinese Koreans who had lived in Korea since they were born. 
As acquiring permanent residency is difficult for marriage immigrants, they usually make a 
choice between naturalization and other limited status keeping their origin country 
nationality. 
<Table 2 to be Inserted Here> 
<Table 2> shows that the law was revised in 1997 so that all foreign spouses have 
to reside in Korea for two years in order to apply for citizenship. They also now had to take 
an exam and acquire a certain level of score in Korean language and Korean history until it 
became exempted again in 2003. The purpose of conditional residence was to protect 
Korean men from marrying foreign brides who only want to acquire Korean nationality 
easily. Also it is required for marriage immigrants to get consensus and affidavit of 
                                                          
6 In 2010, the Korean government allowed dual nationality under the condition that people do not 
exercise their foreign nationality while in Korea. 
11  
financial support from their Korean spouses when applying for Korean nationality. This 
revision created a situation in which marriage immigrants' ability to remain in Korea 
depends exclusively on their husband’s good will and stable marriage. 
The revision with new requirements raised worried voices about the bargaining 
position of foreign brides whose empowerment is already low. When faced with domestic 
violence or neglect at home, they now have to choose between uncertain public protection 
and deportation. Therefore, many women would choose to remain in unhappy marriage 
even with abusive husbands since termination of marriage can lead to deportation. Faced by 
critique, the government added some exceptions in 2004 that foreign spouses can acquire 
Korean nationality in case of death or disappearing of the Korean spouse even though they 
have not fulfilled all requirements. However, these new exceptions could hardly help 
foreign brides since the language and cultural barriers often preclude them from getting 
legal support or seeking help. 
 
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Multicultural Family Data 
We employ the “Multicultural Family Data” collected by the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family in 2012 to examine the impact of nationality acquisition on bargaining 
power of marriage immigrants. The survey employed a two-stage clustering sampling and 
includes households with immigrants and Koreans. The survey was conducted in ten 
different languages in order to acquire accurate information of foreign brides with low 
Korean proficiency. All our estimates are calculated based on survey design and given 
weights.  
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The survey has foreign-born brides, foreign-born grooms, and single immigrants 
who naturalized eventually. The sample contains 15,000 of marriage immigrants, their 
spouse, their children, and any other family member living together. The survey aimed to 
contain comprehensive information of each household and also surveyed their Korean 
spouses, parents-in-law living together, and also their children. It not only contains 
demographic characteristics and a labor-market survey, but also has comprehensive 
variables about their subjective well-being, experience of discrimination, and conflicts with 
other family members. The richness of our data allows us to perform propensity score 
matching based on all those characteristics acquired before nationality acquisition.  
The survey does not keep track of marriage immigrants whose marriage is 
dissoluted and thereby went back to their countries of origin. Also, as survey employed 
interview to collect information, it does not have sample of marriage immigrants whose 
marriage is indeed fake and do not maintain marriage. The bias stemming from the attrition 
is ambiguous and we do not discuss its effect in this paper. However, restricting our 
analyses to those who remain in marriage and who can be tracked would not limit the 
policy implication of this paper as they who remain in marriage are indeed the target of 
future policy.  
 
3.2 Legal Status of Foreign Brides 
<Figure 3 to be Inserted Here> 
<Figure 4 to be Inserted Here> 
<Figure 3> shows the difference in preference on legal status across foreign-born 
brides from different origin countries. Brides from developing countries such as Vietnam, 
China, and Philippines are more likely to prefer acquisition of Korean nationality for the 
better job opportunities and welfare benefits. On the contrary, most of Japanese brides want 
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to keep their Japanese passport and remain as foreigners. <Figure 4> shows that this legal 
preference is reflected in their actual status. Fewer than 5% percent of Japanese brides and 
Western brides are naturalized as Korean while more than 50% of typical marriage 
immigrants acquired Korean nationality. All these figures indicate that there exists 
significant difference in legal status according to origin country of foreign-born brides.  
<Figure 5 to be Inserted Here> 
<Figure 5> shows trends of nationality acquisition around the revision of nationality 
law in 1997. The revision was enacted in late 1997, but was effective since 1998. In spite of 
the introduction of restrictive nationality law, the proportion of brides who currently hold 
Korean nationality remained level for the cohort of brides who married after 1998. <Figure 
6> shows that the difference in the nationality acquisition mainly comes from the two-year 
conditional residence and administrative process. For foreign-born brides who married after 
1998, the share of brides with nationality sharply increases after two years and quickly 
reaches more than 50% for most cohorts within five years. 
<Figure 6 to be Inserted Here> 
 
3.3 Measuring Bargaining Power of Marriage Immigrants 
In this section, we discuss the choice of our various outcome variables and the 
compare simple difference between groups with nationality and without nationality. With 
the language barrier and lack of social protection they are likely to have a low bargaining 
position at the work place and thereby receive relatively lower wages and non-regular 
positions compared with workers with nationality. Therefore we chose working as a regular 
status as the main variable reflecting bargaining power of foreign brides in the labor market.  
<Table 3 to be Inserted Here> 
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Table 3 shows that there is no statistically significant difference between marriage 
immigrants with nationality and without nationality in terms of working status. However, 
direction of difference indicates that brides with nationality have a slightly higher chance of 
being hired as a regular worker conditional on that they are currently working in a labor 
market. 
To examine bargaining power of marriage immigrants, we chose three variables 
showing their decision power in expenditure and asset allocation in households. The first 
variable we used to measure bargaining power is active involvement in expenditure 
decision. Women’s decision making has been used in the literature to as a measure of 
bargaining power. Allendorf (2007) used question on who has the final say on household 
expenditure as a measure of women’s empowerment. Connelly et al (2010) also employed 
questions about who usually makes decisions on large purchases as variable reflecting 
women’s position in a household.  
The multicultural survey has question asking respondents about degree of equality 
in decision regarding daily expenditure. The questions have a five-point scale where middle 
point indicates equal involvement in decision making. We created indicator variables of 
active involvement in decision making for respondents who answered that their 
involvement in those decisions are more than equal.  
It is challenging to make sure that variable about everyday expenditure decision 
making captures women’s bargaining power in a household. Women who do not make their 
own income may be given a budget from their husband for food and household expenses. In 
this case, decision making in everyday expenditure is their responsibility rather than higher 
position of women in a household.  
Therefore, we also employ question regarding degree of equality in asset allocation 
decision. The ownership of or control over assets is found to be related to women’s 
15  
bargaining power from previous studies. Beegle, Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) used the 
wife’s control of assets owned by family affects use of prenatal care in Indonesia. Panda 
and Agarwal (2005) also found out that land ownership decreases domestic violence against 
women in India. Therefore, we employ women’s active involvement in asset allocation 
decision as our variable reflecting women’s bargaining power in a household.  
Consumption is in general is a measure of people’s well-being. Most case, data does 
not provide individual consumption. However, in case where there are goods that can be 
clearly identified as private individual goods, expenditure on these goods can be used as an 
outcome measure of that individual’s bargaining power.  Golan and Lay (2008) categorize 
alcohol and tobacco as male items, and examined how the share of income affects 
expenditure on those male items.  
We employ the experience of inviting family living in the origin country as an 
important bargaining power indicator of marriage immigrants. Inviting family from the 
origin country is a type of consumption that is considerably costly and more desirable to 
marriage immigrants. The measure should be considered as indirect measure of bargaining 
power as consumption is an outcome of bargaining power in a household.  
<Table 3> demonstrates that there is a significant difference in these bargaining 
power indicators between marriage immigrants with nationality and without nationality. 
Foreign brides in general show a low level of participation in asset allocation decision. 
However, marriage immigrants with nationality are more likely to show involvement in 
asset allocation decision by 8% points. For expenditure and invitation decisions, having 
nationality is also related to significantly more bargaining power by 10% points and 20% 
points. These summary statistics suggest possibility that having legal entitlement reinforce 
the bargaining power of marriage immigrants.  
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3.4 Possible Endogeneity Issues 
Can the observed association between nationality and bargaining power be causal? 
The association between observed bargaining power of brides and nationality can be biased 
if these groups with nationality and without nationality have systematic differences. Brides 
with nationality may have stayed in Korea for a longer time period and have more 
experience and better communication. Then they are more likely to be hired as a regular 
worker than brides without nationality and experience. Experience and communication skill 
can allow them to exercise more decision power in households as well.  
Difference in preference of nationality acquisition can also affect results. Marriage 
immigrants from difficult economic situations are more likely to acquire nationality. If they 
are also a relatively unskilled worker, then the impact of nationality acquisition on their 
bargaining power in the labor market and households would be underestimated. Therefore, 
in chapter 4 we use a propensity score matching to find a proper comparison group for 
foreign brides with citizenship. 
 
4 Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
4.1 Empirical Strategy 
 In this chapter, we employ non-parametric propensity score matching approach in 
order to identify the causal effect of legal entitlement on bargaining power of marriage 
immigrants. The difficulty of this estimation comes from selection bias, which we shall 
carefully address throughout our implementation of matching. 
 Following the notation in the evaluation literature, let D = 1 if a foreign bride achieved 
Korean nationality and D = 0 otherwise. We then define the outcome for naturalized 
brides (D = 1) as Y(1)  and the outcome for foreign brides (D = 0) as Y(0). Then we can 
define two parameters which are most frequently estimated in the literature. The first one is 
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the average treatment effect (ATE), which is simply the difference of the expected 
outcomes before and after the nationality acquisition. 
 
𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  𝐴𝐴(𝜏𝜏) =  𝐴𝐴[𝑌𝑌 (1) − 𝑌𝑌 (0)]          (1) 
 The parameter measures the expected effect of nationality acquisition on the 
bargaining power of foreign brides if Korean nationality is randomly assigned to all foreign-
born brides. As Heckman (1997) already noted, this estimate is not very interesting to policy 
makers because it includes the effect on brides who do not have the intention to achieve 
Korean nationality. Therefore the parameter we are interested in is the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT), which focuses on the effects on those who want to acquire 
Korean nationality. It is given by the following equation. 
 
𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  =  𝐴𝐴(𝜏𝜏|𝐷𝐷 =  1) =  𝐴𝐴[𝑌𝑌 (1)|𝐷𝐷 =  1] − 𝐴𝐴[𝑌𝑌 (0)|𝐷𝐷 =  1]       (2) 
 The expected value of ATT is the difference of the expected outcomes with and 
without nationality for those who actually acquired nationality. The parameter directly 
measures the actual effect of nationality acquisition, and it can be compared with its costs. 
The estimation issue is that the counter- factual mean for those getting citizenship 
−𝐴𝐴[𝑌𝑌 (0)|𝐷𝐷 =  1]- is not observed, so researchers have to choose a proper substitute for it 
in order to estimate ATT. Using untreated brides who have not acquired nationality can bias 
the results if factors affecting citizenship acquisition also affects outcome variables of our 
interest. The bias can be noted as the difference between a true average treatment effect and 
“selection bias” in the following equation. 
 
𝐴𝐴[𝑌𝑌 (1)|𝐷𝐷 =  1] − 𝐴𝐴[𝑌𝑌 (0)|𝐷𝐷 =  0] 
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 =  𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 +  𝐴𝐴[𝑌𝑌 (0)|𝐷𝐷 =  1]  − 𝐴𝐴[𝑌𝑌 (0)|𝐷𝐷 =  0]     (3) 
 The unbiased average treatment effect can be identified only if the selection bias is 
zero by random treatment. To address this issue, we will take advantage of a rich micro data 
set and the rather simple requirement of nationality application in Korea. We aim to discover 
a proper control group using propensity score matching and identify the average treatment 
effect of having Korean nationality on bargaining position of these foreign brides. 
 
4.2 Requirement of Nationality Application and First Stage Estimation 
A. Choice of Covariates in First Stage 
 To tackle the endogeneity issue mentioned in the previous section, our estimation 
should satisfy the conditional independence assumption. The assumption requires that 
systematic differences between the two groups to be attributed to acquisition of nationality 
given a set of observable variables that affect acquisition of nationality. However, these 
variables should be unaffected by actual acquisition of nationality or anticipation of it. 
 To ensure the conditional independence assumption, we rely on previous literature in 
the migration study of Yang (1994) and requirements of nationality application imposed by 
the Korean government. Yang (1994) showed that the origin of immigrants is an important 
determinant of their naturalization. As origin country is determined when these foreign 
brides are born and not affected by nationality acquisition, it satisfies the conditional 
independence assumption to perform propensity score matching. 
 Requirements for nationality acquisition are also required when marriage immigrants 
initially entered Korea and acquire visa status as a spouse of a Korean. <Table 4> 
summarizes the requirements for each legal status showing that requirements for F2 visas 
and nationality are indeed very similar except for the conditional residence requirement. 
There are mainly three things: marriage, reference, and financial support from Korean spouse. 
Marriage status and financial characteristics of spouses are already determined at the time of 
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marriage and not likely to be affected by acquisition of nationality by foreign brides and 
thereby could be proper covariates in the first stage.  
 
B. Sample Selection for First Stage Estimation 
 We carefully restricted our sample to satisfy a good matching condition. We only 
included marriage immigrants from developing countries in Asia including China, Vietnam, 
and Philippines. To identify marriage immigrants, we selected only people whose elapsed 
time between year of marriage and year of first entry to Korea is the same. Also among 
marriage immigrants without Korean nationality, we restricted our sample to foreign brides 
whose current visa status is spouse of Korean. We also excluded those whose preference for 
naturalization is ambiguous or negative.  
 Our targets were in marriage at the time of survey and between 20 and 50 years old.  
We excluded marriage immigrants who had stayed in Korea less than two years since they 
are not eligible to acquire citizenship. We also excluded foreign brides who stayed more than 
seven years or married more than 10 year to focus our analysis on brides who married after 
the 1997 revision in Korean nationality law. Couples who married before the regime could 
be different from couples who married after the revision and that kind of sample selection 
can bias our results. Studying the behavior of relatively newlyweds allows us to isolate the 
effect of nationality acquisition while minimizing the potential bias from selection into 
marriage. 
 
C. First Stage Estimation 
 We adopt the method of propensity score matching by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
which suggests the use of the probability of acquiring nationality conditional on those pre-
application characteristics in order to reduce the dimensionality problem. <Table 5> shows 
the list of variables we employed in the first stage estimation.  We estimate propensity score 
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using marital status, spousal characteristics, and also origin-fixed effects and income quantile 
of spouses to control for pre-application characteristics of immigrants. Indicators of using a 
marriage broker company are included because this information may reflect the pre-
application bargaining power relationship between brides and their spouses. 
  <Table 5> confirms that marriage immigrants have several notable characteristics. 
The 47.1% of respondents reported that they met through brokerage agencies. The 23.5% is 
all marriage is a remarriage for Korean male and 14.9% to marriage immigrants. Also, 
Korean spouse is on average much older (44.5) than that of marriage immigrants (30.6). 
The years of schooling of Korean male spouse is 11.3 which is slightly lower than that of 
similar age group7. The average years of schooling of marriage immigrants are 9.7 which is 
much lower than average years of schooling of similar age group among Korean female8.  
  <Table 5> also demonstrates that there are substantial differences between marriage 
immigrants with and without nationality. The years of being in Korea and the age of 
marriage immigrants are statistically higher for foreign born brides with nationality 
indicating possibility that these factors can confound our estimates.  Also, house ownership 
which eases the process of nationality acquisition also turned out to be significantly 
different between two groups of marriage immigrants. Finally, the brides who met their 
Korean spouse through brokerage agencies are more likely to remain as F2 visa holder 
implying possibility that those foreign brides through brokerage agencies may have less 
favorable characteristics to acquire nationality.  
 <Table 6> shows our first stage estimation showing that years of residence, education 
of couples, indicator of remarriage, and home ownership turned out to be important factors 
affecting acquisition of nationality. As proof of financial support from spouse is as important 
                                                          
7 According to Barro-Lee Data, average years of schooling by Korean male between age 40 and 44 is 
13.78 years in 2010.  
8 According to Barro-Lee Data, average years of schooling by Korean female between age 30 and 34 is 
14.55 years in 2010.  
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as proof of marital relationship, we also included indicators of income quantile of Korean 
spouses. Origin country matters because some countries allow dual citizenship while the 
others do not. Also, economic and political conditions of origin country affect willingness to 
apply of foreign brides. All these results imply that difference between two groups of 
marriage immigrants should be carefully considered to acquire unbiased estimates.  
 
4.3 Reliability of Matching 
A. Common Support 
 Propensity score matching requires the common support condition to be satisfied. 
Mathematically it simply says that perfect predictability of program participation (citizenship 
acquisition) should be ruled out. 
 0 <  𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 =  1|𝑋𝑋 )  <  1 (4) 
 This condition ensures that people with the same covariates have a positive 
probability of being both citizen and non-citizen. (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999) 
Therefore for each observation in the treatment group, we should be able to find out an 
observation in the control group with the same combination of characteristics. 
Detection of common support can be easily done by visual inspection of the 
propensity score distribution. <Figure 7> shows the distribution of propensity score in the 
treated group (with nationality) and untreated group (without nationality). Though the 
untreated group has a significant size of population who has very low propensity to acquire 
citizenship, we can find matchable observations from the treated group. However, some 
treated group observations have very high propensity to achieve citizenship and cannot be 
matched with the untreated group as no such observations are found. Those off-support 
observations are dropped from the sample for analysis. 
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B. Assessment of Matching Quality 
 We employed nearest-neighbor matching with replacement. We also allowed 
oversampling (2-NN) for efficient use of data. Since the matching process depends on 
propensity score and not on all covariates in the first stage, it has to be checked if the 
matching process well balances the distribution of all the covariates in both the treatment and 
control group. 
In <Table A> in appendix, we show the balance test results of covariates included in the 
first stage estimation using standardized bias as an indicator. All origin indicators and income 
quantile indicators are well matched and post-matching bias is below 6%. Most demographic 
variables are also well matched except age of foreign brides and their spouses. However, 
magnitude of difference is less than one year. Overall our matching quality satisfies criterion 
suggested in the literature.  
 
4.4 Empirical Results and Interpretation 
A. Labor Market Outcomes and Bargaining Power in Households 
<Table 7> demonstrates that nationality acquisition does not affect the probability 
of working in the labor market but increases the chance of being employed as a regular 
worker at a 10% significance level. Being a regular worker implies that workers can get 
protection from the Labor Standard Act and unions. Regular workers are less likely to be 
laid off or replaced and more likely to get employer-sponsored health insurance. Our results 
suggest that having a Korean nationality raises the probability to getting hired as a regular 
worker by 8.7 percentage points and, hence, increases the outside option of marriage by 
raising the chance that they can get a secure job in formal sector.  
We also estimated the effect of nationality acquisition on bargaining power of 
marriage immigrants in households. Before the matching, all measures show significantly 
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higher bargaining power for marriage immigrants with nationality. After matching, 
bargaining power in asset allocation decisions and invitation of family members remain 
statistically significant. Estimates show that having nationality increases the probability of 
being involved in asset allocation decisions of foreign brides by 5.7 percentage points. Also, 
legal entitlement increases the probability to invite their family members from origin 
country by 14 percentage points. Measure of bargaining power in expenditure decisions is 
not significant implying that involvement in expenditure decision may not be a proper 
measure of bargaining power as we discussed in Chapter 3.3. On the whole, our results 
imply that having stable legal status increases bargaining power of marriage immigrants in 
important decisions such as asset and large consumption.  
 
B. The Effect of Network 
Previous literature suggests that having a network within one's own ethnic group 
improves employment and welfare benefit usage of immigrants. (Bertrand, Luttmer, and 
Mullainathan, 2000) Hatton and Leigh (2011) also found out that the longer the immigrant 
community has been established, the better immigrants tend to assimilate using long-run 
data in US.  
Multicultural surveys directly asked marriage immigrants whether they have their 
own ethnic network to share information. In our sample, around 50% of marriage 
immigrants responded that they have their own ethnic network while the other 50% 
responded they do not have such network group. We re-estimated our results across these 
two groups in <Table 8> to see whether our previous results are related with having their 
own network group.  
Results summarized in <Table 8> suggest the possibility that network and legal 
entitlement interactively affect the bargaining power of marriage immigrants in a labor 
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market and a household. In a labor market, legal entitlement both affects the probability of 
being employed and being employed as a regular worker only when marriage immigrants 
have their network groups. On the other hand, for groups of marriage immigrants without 
any network, legal entitlement poses no impact on both outcomes. These results suggest 
that proper labor market information is pre-requisite for the effect of stable legal status.  
For bargaining power in a household, our results show that legal entitlement has its 
own effect on female marriage immigrants’ decision power in a household. Though some 
results lost statistical significance because of reduced sample size, results show that having 
citizenship contributes to more involvement in decision making in asset allocation and 
invitation of female’s family member from origin countries.  
It should be noted that our results are found for samples of marriage immigrants 
who maintain their marriage with their Korean spouse. Our results implies that policy 
targeted for people who do not sustain marital relationship actually have effects on people 
who maintain marital relationship as well. Having stable legal status increases outside 
option of marriage by increasing probability to be hired as a regular worker and providing 
protection from deportation. These outside option empowers bargaining power of marriage 
immigrants who is in marital union even in a family.  
 
5 Conclusions 
Our paper aims to contribute to the literature by showing that legal framework could 
be an important determinant of bargaining power of female marriage immigrants. Using 
detailed survey of multicultural families and requirement of nationality application, we 
examined propensity score matching estimates which compare female marriage immigrants 
with and without nationality. Our results demonstrate that legal entitlement matters for 
having a regular job in a labor market and more decision power in households. We also 
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show that the network is necessary for someone with nationality to get a favorable job in a 
labor market.  
The bargaining power of female marriage immigrants is not only a policy target by 
itself, but also has potential to provide better assimilation outcomes. Women with 
independent legal status and empowerment could get access to more resource, public 
protection and acceptance from the society.  Empowering female marriage immigrants is 
also important from the perspective of motherhood. The empowerment of these marriage 
immigrants would be vital to the development outcome of the second generation such as 
health and education. The future research should focus more on the linkage between 
marriage immigrants and development outcomes of the second generation and their 
assimilation.  
 This study has important policy implications for Asian countries with 
increasing numbers of marriage immigrants. Our paper suggests that supplementary legal 
support should be provided for those immigrants with vulnerable legal status. A careful 
policy focusing on language education and labor market training will be also necessary for 
their assimilation into the society.  
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Figure 1: Share of Marriages with Foreign Spouses 
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Figure 2: Origin of Foreign Brides 
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Table 1: Visa Status and Legal Eligibility 
 Suffrage Working The Length of Stay Extension 
Nationality Yes Allowed No restriction N/A 
Permanent Resident No Allowed No restriction N/A 
Spouse of Korean (F2) No Allowed 3 Years Yes 
Employment Visa (E) No Allowed Varies by Occupation Varies by Occupation 
Student Visa (D2) No Allowed 2 Years Yes 
Occupational Trainee Visa 
(D3,E8) No Allowed 2 Years Yes 
Business Visitors (H) No Allowed 3 Years Varies by Origin Country 
Visitors Visa (C) No No 90 Days No 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Timeline of the Change of Korean Nationality Act 
 
1948 The Korean Nationality Act was enacted. Foreign brides could acquire Korean citizenship along with marriage. 
1963 Foreigners who acquired Korean citizenship should repudiate original nationality within six months. 
1997 
Revised to add two year-residential requirement to foreign spouses. 
Foreign spouses also have to pass nationality eligibility exam to acquire 
Korean citizenship. 
2003 Nationality eligibility exam was abolished for marriage immigrants. 
2004 Allowed exceptions to foreign spouses in special cases to protect and support their children. 
2009 KIIP 
May 4th 2010 Dual Nationality Allowed 
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Figure 3: Foreign Bride’s Preference on Legal Status 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Legal Status of Foreign Brides 
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Figure 5: The Legal Status of Foreign Brides by Year of Marriage 
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Figure 6: Trends of Citizenship Acquisition 
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Table 3: Labor Market and Bargaining Power Statistics 
Dependent Variables Whole 
Sample 
Without 
Nationality 
With 
Nationality 
Difference 
Labor Market Outcomes 
Working 0.522 
(0.013)  
0.521 
(0.018) 
0.522 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
Employed as a regular worker 
(only workers) 
0.317 
(0.017) 
0.290 
(0.024) 
0.340 
(0.024) 
0.050 
(0.034) 
Bargaining Power in Household 
Active involvement in asset 
allocation decision 
0.167 
(0.010)  
0.124 
(0.013) 
0.201 
(0.015) 
0.077** 
(0.020) 
Active involvement in 
expenditure decision 
0.308 
(0.012) 
0.253 
(0.016) 
0.354 
(0.018) 
0.101** 
(0.024) 
Ever invited family members 0.517 
(0.013)  
0.407 
(0.018) 
0.608 
(0.018) 
0.201** 
(0.025) 
** significanct at 1%. Sample: Marriage immigrants  
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Table 4: Requirements for Legal Entitlement 
Spouse of Korean (F-2 Visa) Simplified Naturalization for 
Marriage Immigrants 
1. Married with Korean spouse 1. Married with Korean spouses 1) 
for the past 2 (or more) consecutive 
years, maintained marriage status 
with the spouse and kept residence in 
Korea or 2) for the past 3 (or more) 
consecutive years, maintained 
marriage status and have spent more 
than 1 year in Korea. 
2. Reference certificate from spouse 2. Participate with spouse and prove 
the normal marriage status is 
maintained. Possible to substitute 
that with the spouse’s identification 
and fact only if unforeseen 
circumstances. 
3. Documents of funds and finance 
(bank balance, lease contract or estate 
more than 30 million won, a 
certificate of incumbency, etc) 
3. Documents of funds and finance 
(bank balance, lease contract or estate 
more than 30 million won, a 
certificate of incumbency, etc) 
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Table 5: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Description All F2 
Visa 
 
Citizen Difference 
Citizen Dummy 
Citizen  =1 if respondent acquired 
nationality 
0.548 
(0.013) 
   
Marriage Characteristics 
Remarriage  =1 if it is a remarriage to 
foreign bride 
0.149 
(0.010) 
0.150 
(0.014) 
0.149 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
Spouse 
Remarriage 
=1 if it is a remarriage to their 
spouse 
0.235 
(0.011) 
0.251 
(0.016) 
0.222 
(0.015) 
-0.028 
(0.022) 
House Own  =1 if they own house 0.564 
(0.013) 
0.507 
(0.018) 
0.611 
(0.018) 
0.103** 
(0.026) 
Broker  =1 if they met through broker 
company 
0.471 
(0.013) 
0.518 
(0.018) 
0.433 
(0.018) 
-0.086** 
(0.026) 
Bride’s Characteristics 
Age  Age of foreign brides 30.61 
(0.183) 
29.93 
(0.267) 
31.17 
(0.248) 
1.24** 
(0.365) 
Stayed  Years of being in Korea 5.36 
(0.028) 
4.864 
(0.037) 
5.766 
(0.036) 
0.902** 
(0.051) 
Schooling  Years of schooling 9.738 
(0.067) 
9.657 
(0.099) 
9.804 
(0.091) 
0.146 
(0.135) 
Spousal Characteristics 
Spouse Age  Age of Korean spouse 44.45 
(0.158) 
44.50 
(0.227) 
44.41 
(0.220) 
-0.090 
(0.316) 
Spouse 
Working 
=1 if Korean spouse is 
working 
0.985 
(0.004) 
0.983 
(0.006) 
0.986 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Spouse 
Schooling 
Years of schooling of Korean 
Spouse 
11.28 
(0.052) 
11.33 
(0.072) 
11.25 
(0.073) 
-0.079 
(0.103) 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 6: Propensity Score Coefficient Estimates 
Variables Probability(Citizenship=1) 
Demographic Variables 
Age 
 
-0.019** 
(0.007) 
 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
Years of being in Korea 
 
2.093** 
(0.395) 
 
2.099** 
(0.396) 
 
2.056** 
(0.399) 
Years of being in Korea2 - 0.143** 
(0.036) 
 
-0.145** 
(0.036) 
 
-0.139** 
(0.037) 
Years of schooling 
 
0.040** 
(0.013) 
 
0.036** 
(0.014) 
 
0.038** 
(0.014) 
Household Variables 
Remarriage  -0.406** 
(0.157) 
-0.392* 
(0.156) 
Spouse Remarriage  -0.053 
(0.094) 
-0.059 
(0.098) 
Home ownership  0.299** 
(0.072) 
0.299** 
(0.072) 
Broker  -0.123 
(0.085) 
-0.123 
(0.085) 
Spouse Characteristics 
Age   -0.007 
(0.008) 
Years of Schooling   -0.038* 
(0.019) 
Working   0.317 
(0.332) 
Fixed Effects 
Origin Fixed Effects  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Spouse Income Quantile   Controlled 
Sub-population Size 1,968 1,968 1,968 
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%   
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Figure 7: Common Support 
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Table 7: Labor Market Outcomes and Bargaining Power 
Dependent Variables  Sample Treated Controls Difference T-
statistic 
N 
Labor Market Outcomes 
Employed Unmatched 
Matched 
0.518 
0.518 
0.498 
0.470 
0.019 
0.048 
0.85 
1.22 
979 
974 
Employed as a regular 
worker 
(only workers) 
Unmatched 
Matched 
0.346 
0.347 
0.275 
0.259 
0.071 
0.087 
2.43 
1.76 
488 
505 
Bargaining Power in Household 
Involved in asset 
allocation decision 
Unmatched 
Matched 
0.172 
0.168 
0.116 
0.111 
0.055 
0.057 
3.51 
2.42 
979 
989 
Involved in daily 
expenditure decision 
Unmatched 
Matched 
0.243 
0.283 
0.243 
0.283 
0.080 
0.038 
3.97 
1.20 
979 
974 
Ever invited family 
members 
Unmatched 
Matched 
0.588 
0.586 
0.418 
0.438 
0.171 
0.148 
7.68 
4.09 
979 
974 
 
 
 
Table 8: Effect of Legal Status by Brides with and without Network 
Dependent 
Variables  
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-
Stat 
Labor Market Outcomes 
Employed With Network 
Without Network 
0.527 
0.530 
0.432 
0.587 
0.096 
-0.057 
0.046 
0.064 
2.08 
-0.89 
Employed as a 
regular worker 
(only workers) 
With Network 
Without Network 
0.373 
0.306 
0.286 
0.312 
0.088 
-0.005 
0.061 
0.072 
1.44 
-0.07 
Bargaining Power in Household 
Involved in asset 
allocation decision 
With Network 
Without Network 
0.152 
0.185 
0.101 
0.148 
0.051 
0.037 
0.027 
0.038 
1.88 
0.97 
Involved in daily 
expenditure 
decision 
With Network 
Without Network 
0.313 
0.316 
0.318 
0.211 
-0.004 
0.105 
0.038 
0.048 
-0.11 
2.20 
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Ever invited family 
members 
With Network 
Without Network 
0.622 
0.519 
0.472 
0.275 
0.150 
0.244 
0.042 
0.055 
3.58 
4.44 
Appendix 
 
 
Table A. Matching Quality 
 
Variables Sample 
Mean 
% bias T-test 
Treated Control 
Age 
Unmatched 30.5 29.7 13.4 2.97 
Matched 30.5 29.8 10.4 2.38 
Years of being in Korea 
Unmatched 5.7 4.9 85.2 18.9 
Matched 5.7 5.6 4.4 0.94 
Years of schooling 
Unmatched 9.9 10.1 -4.4 -0.97 
Matched 9.9 10.1 -5.8 -1.35 
Remarriage 
Unmatched 0.11 0.12 -1.6 -0.36 
Matched 0.11 0.10 5.9 1.36 
Spouse remarriage 
Unmatched 0.21 0.23 -7.9 -1.75 
Matched 0.21 0.19 3.8 0.88 
Home ownership 
Unmatched 0.63 0.55 17.0 3.77 
Matched 0.62 0.66 -7.1 -1.61 
Married through broker 
Unmatched 0.48 0.52 -7.5 -1.67 
Matched 0.48 0.46 4.8 1.07 
Spouse age 
Unmatched 44.3 44.3 1.2 0.26 
Matched 44.4 43.6 13.1 2.89 
Spouse years of 
schooling 
Unmatched 11.2 11.3 -4.5 -1.01 
Matched 11.2 11.3 -3.9 -0.88 
Spouse working 
Unmatched 0.9 1.0 -3.8 -0.83 
Matched 0.9 1.0 -3.9 -0.86 
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Table A. Matching Quality (continued) 
 
Origin Indicators Sample 
Mean 
% bias T-test 
Treated Control 
Chinese 
Unmatched 0.17 0.12 13.9 3.09 
Matched 0.17 0.16 3.5 0.73 
Korean Chinese 
Unmatched 0.16 0.05 34.8 7.72 
Matched 0.15 0.15 0.5 0.10 
Mongolia 
Unmatched 0.04 0.08 -18.4 -4.08 
Matched 0.04 0.04 -1.1 -0.30 
Vietnam 
Unmatched 0.36 0.34 3.3 0.73 
Matched 0.36 0.36 0.1 0.02 
Philippines 
Unmatched 0.11 0.16 -15.2 -3.36 
Matched 0.11 0.10 3.7 0.90 
Thailand 
Unmatched 0.01 0.06 -27.9 -6.21 
Matched 0.01 0.01 -2.4 -0.95 
Cambodia 
Unmatched 0.15 0.16 -3.3 -0.72 
Matched 0.15 0.16 -3.6 -0.78 
Uzbekistan 
Unmatched 0.02 0.04 -11.0 -2.45 
Matched 0.02 0.02 -4.5 -1.10 
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Table A. Matching Quality (continued) 
 
Variables Sample 
Mean 
% bias T-test 
Treated Control 
Income quantile 1 
Unmatched 0.04 0.03 1.5 0.32 
Matched 0.04 0.04 -0.8 -0.18 
Income quantile 2 
Unmatched 0.07 0.09 -7.8 -1.73 
Matched 0.07 0.08 -2.1 -0.48 
Income quantile 3 
Unmatched 0.21 0.21 -0.3 -0.06 
Matched 0.21 0.20 3.3 0.73 
Income quantile 4 
Unmatched 0.26 0.26 0.3 0.07 
Matched 0.26 0.24 4.1 0.91 
Income quantile 5 
Unmatched 0.20 0.20 1.8 0.39 
Matched 0.20 0.18 5.0 1.12 
Income quantile 6 
Unmatched 0.11 0.11 -0.7 -0.15 
Matched 0.11 0.14 -9.1 -1.91 
Income quantile 7 
Unmatched 0.06 0.04 5.9 1.30 
Matched 0.05 0.08 -10.9 -2.13 
Income quantile 8 
Unmatched 0.02 0.03 -7.2 -1.60 
Matched 0.02 0.02 2.9 0.76 
Income quantile 9 
Unmatched 0.02 0.01 4.1 0.91 
Matched 0.02 0.02 -1.3 -0.26 
Income quantile 10 
Unmatched 0.01 0.01 7.6 1.68 
Matched 0.01 0.01 5.6 1.22 
 
 
